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Abstract
Stability of evolutionary dynamics of non-repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game with non-uniform interaction rates [1], via benefit and cost dilemma
is studied . Moreover , the stability condition ( b+c
b−c
)2 < r1r3 is derived
in case of coexistence between cooperators and defectors .If r1, r3 −→∞
cooperation is the dominant strategy and defectors can no longer exploit
cooperators.
Key words: Prisoner’s Dilemma game, non-uniform interaction rates
and Dynamical Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Introduction
Evolutionary game theory[3] was first introduced by John Maynard Smith
in 1973[2]. He invented the important concept of an evolutionarily stable strat-
egy (ESS) that resist invasion of other strategies in infinitely large populations.
Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game[4] studies cooperation between unrelated indi-
viduals. In non-repeated PD,individuals are either cooperators or defectors,
acting accordingly whenever two of them interact. They both receive R upon
mutual cooperation and P upon mutual defection. A defector exploiting a co-
operator gets an amount T and the exploited cooperator receives S, such that
1
T>R>P>S .So, it is best to defect, regardless of the opponent’s decision, which
in turns makes cooperators unable to resist invasion by defectors.
In this paper, we study the effect of non-uniform interaction rates on evolu-
tionary dynamics of non-repeated PD game [1], via benefit and cost dilemma .
In section 1, we present the classical approach of the replicator equation of PD
with uniform interaction rate between any two individuals. This rate does not
depend on the strategies of these individuals. In section 2,we assume that the
interaction rates are not uniform. For example, players who use the same strat-
egy might interact more frequently than players who use different strategies.
Non-uniform interaction rates lead to non-linear fitness functions and therefore
allow richer dynamics than the classical replicator equation, which is based on
linear fitness functions. If strategy D is a strict Nash equilibrium[5], then it
remains uninvadable for positive non-uniform interaction rates. If D dominates
C then non-uniform interaction rates can introduce a pair of interior equilibria;
one of them is stable the other one is unstable. If C and D coexist, then non-
uniform interaction rates cannot change the qualitative dynamics, but alter
the location of the stable equilibrium.
1 Dynamical PD game with uniform interaction
rate
Consider PD game between two players each having two strategies C(cooperation)
and D (defection) and Cooperator pay a benefit b at a cost c to his Cooperator
opponent, whereas Defector opponent only receive a benefit b [6]. Then we
have payoff matrix


b − c −c
b 0

 (1)
2
where, b > c > 0.We denote by x and y the frequency of individuals adopting
strategy C and D, respectively. We have x+ y = 1.
In case of uniform interaction rate between any two individuals. We assume
that interaction rate is independent of their strategies. The selection dynamics
can be described by replicator equation [7]
x˙ = x(1 − x)(fC − fD) (2)
The fitness of C and D players are linear functions of x and y, given by
fC = (b− c)x− cy , fD = bx. (3)
The entire population will eventually consist of Defectors ,since b > b−c and
0 > −c .The only stable equilibrium is x = 0. D is a strict Nash equilibrium,and
therefore an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).
2 Stability in dynamical PD game with non-
uniform interaction rates
Suppose that an interaction between two players depends on their strategies.
Let r1, r2, r3 be reaction rates between each two players and r1, r2, r3 > 0 .
where,r1 is an interaction rate of Cooperator with another Cooperator, r2 is
an interaction rate of Cooperator with Defector, and r3 is an interaction rate
of Defector with another Defector.
For uniform interaction rates r1 = r2 = r3 the strategy D dominates the
strategy C. Hence, eventually the entire population will consist of defectors.
However, if players only interact with opponents of the same strategy, then
cooperators cannot be exploited by defectors. In this case, where r2 = 0 and
r1, r3 > 0 ,cooperation is the dominant strategy, because b − c > 0.Assume
r2 6= 0 which means that cooperators and defectors do interact. Without loss
3
of generality, assume that r2 = 1.
The fitness of individuals is determined by the average payoff over a large
number of interactions. Therefore, the fitness of C and D players are non-linear
functions of x and y, given by
fC =
(b − c)r1x− cy
r1x+ y
, fD =
bx
x+ r3y
(4)
The replicator equations can be reduced to
x˙ = x(1 − x)(fC − fD) (5)
where,
fC − fD = ((b − c)r1x− cy)(x+ r3y)− (bx)(r1x+ y)
(r1x+ y)(x+ r3y)
The equilibrium points are either on the boundary or in the interior. The
boundary points x = 0 is stable equilibrium while x = 1 is unstable equilibrium.
If fC − fD = 0 and x + y = 1then we have two interior equilibrium are given
by
x∗ =
−(α− 2γ)±
√
α2 − 4βγ
2(β + γ − α) (6)
where,
α = r1r3(b− c)− (b + c) , β = −r1c , γ = −r3c
α2 > 4βγ , β + γ < α , α > 2γ , α > 2β
In case of non- uniform interaction rate ,the selection dynamics depend on
the size of r1r3 relative to ρ
2.[1] where,
4
ρ =
b+ c
b− c and ρ > 1 . (7)
If r1r3 < (
b+c
b−c
)2 then defection is the dominant strategy. When r1r3 = (
b+c
b−c
)2.we
have the bifurcation [8] point at
x∗ =
√
r3√
r1 +
√
r3
(8)
If r1r3 > (
b+c
b−c
)2 the two interior equilibria (6) move symmetrically away from
the bifurcation point (8) toward the end points.
As r1 and r3 increase the stable interior equilibrium point moves from the
bifurcation point (8) closer toward 1.Whereas, unstable interior equilibrium
point moves from the bifurcation point (8) closer toward 0.As r1, r3 −→ ∞
we recover the case where r2 = 0 and cooperation is the dominant strategy as
defectors can no longer exploit cooperators.
3 Conclusion
For the non-repeated PD game, coexistence between cooperators and defectors
is possible if the ratio of homogeneous r1, r3over heterogeneous r2interaction
rates exceeds a critical value. If r1 = r3 = ρ, then the pair of equilibria ap-
proaches cooperator frequency of x = 1
2
which is entirely independent of the
payoff matrix, as long as b > b − c > 0 > −c . Both equilibria are stable, one
consists of defectors alone, and the other consists of a mixture of defectors and
cooperators.
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